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INTRODUCTION

The United States does not have a clearly articulated court-access
policy for cases involving foreign parties. As a result, federal judges
* Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This article was
prepared for Southwestern Journal of International Law symposium "Our Courts and the World:
Transnational Litigation and Civil Procedure." I thank Stephen Burbank. Paul Dubinsky, Thorn
Main. Austen Parrish, and AndrewS. Pollis for valuable discussion and feedback on this project.
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make vastly inconsistent decisions about when to d_ismiss a cas~ in
favor of a foreign forum and when to go forward With the case m a
u.s. court. Judges' unarticulated assumptions about their gatekeeping
role in controlling court access, combined with their largely unreviewable discretion in making those forum-access decisions, have created a
highly inefficient forum-selection system.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, which drives much of the
current inefficiency, can be stated much more easily than it can be
applied. 1 Under the doctrine, a district court possesses discretion to
dismiss a case if (1) there is another forum that is both adequate and
available to hear the case; and (2) both the public interest2 and the
parties' private interests 3 weigh in favor of having the case heard by
the alternate forum. In practice, the doctrine causes innumerable
headaches to judges and litigants dealing with transnational cases.
Scholars and litigators alike have criticized courts for applying the forum non conveniens doctrine in ways that are unpredictable, chaotic,
and markedly different from one court to another. 4
Many proposals have been offered to solve the problem. A number of these proposals offer ways to refine and better articulate the
interests that the forum non conveniens doctrine protects. 5 Other prol. See GARY B. BoRN & PETER B. RuTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES CouRTs 369 (4th ed. 2007) ("Perhaps because it is a catchy Latin phrase, the
forum non conveniens doctrine appears deceptively easy to comprehend.").
2. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (identifying the public interest
factors as "the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the 'local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home'; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case
in a forum that is at home with the law that must _govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of
burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty").
3. ld. (identifying the private interest factors as "the 'relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action: and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive'").
4. See, e.g., Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis,
77 TuL. L. REv. 309, 352-53 (2002); see also M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang
Litigation: How Convenienr Is Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 B.Y.U.
INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 51 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non
Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAvrs L. REv. 559, 602-03 (2007); Note, Cross-Jurisdictional Forum Non
Conveniens Preclusion, 121 HARV. L. REv. 2178, 2195-99 (2008); Emily J. Derr, Note, Striking a
Beuer Public-Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens, 93 CoRNELL L. REv. 819, 841-48
(2008); Finity E. Jernigan, Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Whose Convenience and Justice?, 86
TEXAs L. REv. 1079, 1120-21 (2008); Leah Nico, Note, From Local to Global: Reform of Forum
Non Conveniens Needed to Ensure Justice in the Era of Globalization, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM.
345, 360-62 (2005).
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posals focus on institutional choice, suggesting that the other branches
of government-particularly Congress-should take a larger role in
setting court-access policy in general. 6 A few commentators have recommended heightening the standard of review applied to forum non
conveniens decisions. 7
While each of these substantive proposals would go a long way
toward resolving the current uncertainty and inefficiency-and any of
these proposals would be preferable to the current morass 8 -none of
these proposals is likely to be effective without corresponding procedural protections. The fundamental inconsistency in how judges apply
the forum non conveniens doctrine cannot be eliminated unless appellate courts are able to review district court decisions to deny forum
non conveniens motions as well as decisions to grant them. Although
the Supreme Court has held that forum non conveniens decisions are
not subject to interlocutory review as a matter of right, 9 such a right
could still be created outside the common-law process. Ideally, Con6. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens
in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and A Proposal for A Uniform Standard. 28
TEx. lNT'L L.J. 501, 524-25 (1993) ("The clearest and most direct solution. however. would be
the enactment of a federal statute, limiting access to United States courts to foreign plaintiffs
seeking relief for claims that arise outside of the United States. Such a statute would reflect not
only the traditional procedural concerns of forum non conveniens but also the avowedly substantive aspects of an international relations law."): see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigarion and Institlllional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1081, 1131 (2010) ("Reform will be
best accomplished when all three branches take an active role: Congress in articulating an initial
court-access policy, the executive branch in negotiating bilateral treaties and multilateral courtaccess conventions, and the judiciary in applying these policies to individual cases."); Stephen B.
Burbank. Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National
Law, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 203,245 (2001) ("[L]egislation could dispose of doubts about the legitimacy of forum non conveniens dismissals under certain federal regulatory statutes. Congress
could do so simply by enumerating the federal statutory claims, if any, to which the doctrine
could not be applied. Alternatively and probably preferably, Congress could articulate the relevance of regulatory interest, broadly defined, to the analysis and thus perhaps influence the
development of doctrine in areas not formally reached by its commands."): Peter J. Carney,
International Forum Non Conveniens: "Section 1404.5" -A Proposal in the Interest of Sovereigmy, Comity, and Individual Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 415, 464 (1995) ("Codification carries
the advantage of uniformity among the circuits and the prevention of courts clinging to old or
different standards for dismissal.").
7. Andrew R. Klein, Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum non Conveniens, and Consistency, in SELECTED EssAYS ON CuRRENT LEGAL IssuEs 193 (David Frenkel & Carsten Gerner-Beuerle
eds .. 2008) (advocating de novo review on appeal); Nicholas A. Fromherz, A Call for Stricter
Appellate Review of Decisions on Forum Non Conveniens, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUmEs L.
REv._ (2012) (forthcoming) available at http://works.bepress.com/nicholas_fromherz/l/.
8. See infra Part I.
9. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988). Shortly after Supreme Court
foreclosed collateral- order review, one commentator urged Congress to adopt a statutory right
of interlocutory review for both forum non conveniens and venue transfer decisions. See
Christina Melady Morin, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and Venue Transfer
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gress should adopt a statute that articulates both the substantive policy and the procedural protections of the doctrine. In the absence of
such a statute, the federal rulemaking process, however, could at least
provide a right of interlocutory review. 10 In the meantime, the district
courts and appellate courts may and should liberally certify individual
cases for interlocutory appeal. 11

II.

THE NEED FOR GREATER UNIFORMITY IN FoRUM NoN
CoNVENIENs

For decades, scholars have decried the fact that the forum non
conveniens doctrine, at least as applied by federal courts within the
United States, lacks coherence and fails to offer predictable results.
The doctrine has been described as a "crazy quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and inconsistent decisions. " 12 Court decisions have not offered
much solace: even the Supreme Court has stated that the degree of a
district court's discretion and the number of factors to be considered
"make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible"
and mean that parties cannot rely on the doctrine to determine
"where to sue or where one is subject to being sued." 13 This lack of
predictability takes a significant toll on litigants in transnational cases.
A.

Litigation Inefficiency

A great deal of time and money is spent litigating over forum
choice. The effort expended by parties litigating this issue is grossly
disproportional to the actual amount of transnational litigation in U.S.
courts. 14 The skewed distribution may be explained by the "80/20
Rule," a heuristic derived from economist Vilfredo Pareto's 1896 hyOrders, 59 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 715 (1991). Congress failed to do so, and the problems associated with a lack of effective interlocutory review have only grown in the last two decades.
10. 28 U.S.C. 1292(e) (2006) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).").
11. Interlocutory review may be available by mandamus or through 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) in
exceptional cases. See infra Part IV.B.
12. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 785 (1985).
13. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller. 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994).
14. In the calendar year 2011, there were approximately 200 judicial opinions analyzing a
transnational forum non conveniens challenge, as shown by a Westlaw search for opinions containing at least four instances of the phrase "forum non conveniens." While transnational cases
still comprise a small percentage of the number of cases filed in federal court, see Christopher A.
Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CoRNELL L. REv. 481, 529 (2011)
("[T]he decline of alienage litigation raises substantial doubts about the claim that the United
States is experiencing a transnational litigation explosion."), the number of forum non con-
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pothesis of an "extreme distribution ... whereby a relatively small
proportion of elements generates a large proportion of distribution." 15
In the case of forum non conveniens, the disproportionality results
from two salient characteristics of the current doctrine: first, its nearly
dispositive effect on the ultimate outcome of the case; and second, its
inconsistency within and among the federal circuits. As a result, the
resources expended in litigation over forum choice may even exceed
the resources expended in litigating the merits of many transnational
disputes. 16
For foreign plaintiffs in particular, a U.S. court is often the only
effective forum; loser-pay rules, lower damages, and the lack of contingency fees in many other countries may preclude re-filing in another country if the U.S. court dismisses the suitY Even if the plaintiff
refiles elsewhere, the defendant may resist enforcement of the foreign
judgment despite having successfully procured a dismissal in favor of
that foreign forum. 18 Because dismissal often ends the case, defendants have historically had a strong incentive to file a forum non conveniens motion irt nearly every case with a plausible alternative forum,
and plaintiffs have likewise had a strong incentive to fight strongly
against dismissal. Thus, both parties are motivated to zealously contest the forum non conveniens issue at the district court level.
When the parties litigate forum non conveniens, they have no
shortage of issues to argue about; the doctrine is highly unsettled, with
intercircuit and intracircuit cont1icts on a large number of issues. Two
veniens dismissals appears to growing. See Donald Earl Childress IlL When Erie Goes International, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 37, 46).
15. Mira Burri-Nenova. Trade versus Culture in the Digital Environment: An Old Conflict in
Need of a New Definition. 12 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 17, 62 (2009).
16. See Barry Friedman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fragmemation of the Federal Rules, 79
JumcATURE 67, 70 (1995) ("The more two sides in a lawsuit see the costs or outcome depending
on the district where the case is litigated, the more there will be fights over venue and
jurisdiction.").
17. Victor Manual Diaz, Jr., quoted in John F. Molloy, Miami Conference Summary of
Presentations, 20 ARIZ. J. lNT'L & CaMP. LAw 47, 93 (stating tbat an Italian law professor's
empirical study had found that "ninety-nine percent of cases dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds in the United States, are, for one reason or another, never refiled. Thus, the fact is that
the forum non conveniens dismissal is, in most instances, a dispositive dismissal of the litigation."); David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction", 103 L.Q. REv. 398, 418-20 (1987) (also finding that many dismissed cases are
never refiled); bw see Robertson, Transnational Litigation and !J1Slitwional Choice, supra note 6
(noting that other countries are beginning to encourage the refiling of such cases in the plaintiffs'
home forum).
18. See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens
and the En.forcemenl of Foreign Judgments, 111 CoLUM. L. REv. 1444. 1447 (2011).
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recent scholars have attempted to catalogue these inconsistencies, noting that current conflicts include:
1. Disagreement about whether to "consider whether the
United States' judgment is enforceable abroad" or "whether
a judgment acquired in the alternative jurisdiction would be
enforceable in the United States"; 19
2. Differing policies about whether to consider the public interest factors at all when the private interest factors weigh in
favor of dismissal;2°
3. Disagreement about whether to compare "the interests of the
foreign forum" with the interest of the U.S. forum; 21
4. Differing analyses of docket congestion, as some courts will
provide a comparative analysis of congestion, while others
will consider only "the absolute congestion of their own court
dockets"; 22
5. Different weight given to the role of relevant treaties, including the former Warsaw Convention23 various treaties of
"Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation" that contain opencourt provisions,24 and the International Covenant on Civii
and Political Rights; 25
19. M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is Forum
Non Conveniens in Transnational Licigacion?, 4 B.Y.U. lNT'L L. & MoMT. REv. 21, 25 n.15
(2007) (comparing Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1233
(2d Cir. 1996) with Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824. 836 (5th Cir. 1993)).
20. !d. ("The Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits do not consider the public interest factors at
all if the private interest factors indicate that the case should be dismissed, while all the other
circuits give equal weight to each category.").
21. !d. (citing SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097,
1101-05 (11th Cir. 2004)).
22. !d. (comparing Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 609 (lOth Cir. 1998) with
Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 1991)).
23. !d. (comparing Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Crash
Disaster), 821 F.2d 1147, 1160-62 (5th Cir. 1987) with Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d
989. 1004 (9th Cir. 2002) ).
24. Allan Jay Stevenson, Forum Non Conveniens and Equal Access Under Friendship, Comnzerce, and Navigation Treaties: A Foreign Plaintiffs Rights. 13 HAsTINGS lNT'L & CoMP. L.
REv. 267, 267 (1990): see also Irish Nat'! Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.
1984); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litig., 190 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1136
(S.D. Ind. 2002) (holding that the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Venezuela provides "expatriate U.S. nationals and treaty nationals
residing in their home countries ... the same preference of their choice of forum, with the
consideration that suing in a United States forum while residing in a foreign country is less likely
to be convenient").
25. Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that
plaintiffs had unsuccessfully "invoke[ d) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"
to argue against forum non conveniens dismissal).
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6.

Inconsistent analysis regarding whether a potential alternative forum should be considered "available" to the litigants. 26
In addition to these conflicts in the law of forum non conveniens,
there is also uncertainty about whether the Erie doctrine would require federal courts to apply state forum non conveniens law. 27 And
finally, a new conflict has recently arisen: whether an action filed to
enforce an arbitration award can be subject to dismissal for forum non
conveniens. Although the majority view is that the New York Convention prohibits such dismissals, the Second Circuit has recently held to
the contrary and ordered the dismissal of a party's attempt to enforce
an arbitration award. 28
Given the strong incentive of both parties to fight vigorously over
forum choice, and given the number of conflicts surrounding the doctrine, it is no surprise that the parties find plenty of ammunition with
which to battle over forum choice. As a result, defendants file a forum
non conveniens motion in nearly every case involving foreign parties,
and the court must therefore take the time to work through all the
arguments involved in that motion. 29

26. Casey & Ristoph, supra note 19. at 25 n.15 (comparing Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas. Ltd .. 52 F.3d 1220. 1227 (3d Cir. 1995) with Leon v. Millon Air. Inc .. 251 F.3d1305. 1311-12
(11th Cir. 2001)).
27. Apotex Corp. v.lstituto Biologico Chemioterapico S.p.a., 02 C 5345. 2003 WL 21780965
(N.D. Ill. July 30, 2003) ("There appears to be a conflict between the circuits on the question
whether forum non conveniens is governed by federal or state law in a diversity case.") (comparing Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir.l945) (state law). with Rivendell Forest Prods .. Ltd.
v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 992 (lOth Cir.1993) (federal law); Royal Bed & Spring Co. v.
Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis, Ltd., 906 F.2d 45, 50 (1st Cir.1990)(federal law); and
In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir.1987) (en bane)
(federal law)). See also 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT et a/ .. Federal Practice and Procedure
§3828.5 (2007) ("In determining the appropriate law for deciding the forum non conveniens
motion, the Supreme Court repeatedly has declined to decide whether state notions of forum
non conveniens are binding on a federal court in a diversity of citizenship action."); Stephen B.
Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibrarion: Paths to A Via Media?, 26
Hous. J. lNT'L L. 385, 404 n.30 (2004) (expressing doubt that federal forum non conveniens law
should be applied in diversity cases).
28. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, No. 09-3925-CV
L. 2011 WL 6188497 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2011).
29. Walter W. Heiser. Forum Non Conveniens and RetaliaTOry Legislation: The Impact on
the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a
Defense Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 609 (2008) ("A motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens has become the primary response of domestic defendants to tort actions brought by
foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts.''); Russell J. Weintraub. flllemational Litigation and Forum Non
Conveniens. 29 TEx. lNT'L L..l. 321. 322 (1994).
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Overall, the dismissal rate for forum non conveniens is just over
half-that is, similar to the success rate of predicting a coin toss. 30
When the case involves foreign plaintiffs and arises out of the activities of U.S. corporate defendants in the plaintiffs' home country,
courts will usually-but certainly not always-dismiss the case in
favor of litigation in the plaintiffs' home forum. 31
In addition to taking up a disproportionate amount of time at the
district court level, this skewed distribution carries over into appellate
proceedings. The unsettled nature of the doctrine means that the same
arguments made in the district courts will likely be made again on
appeal. If and when the defendant wins dismissal, the plaintiff will
almost certainly attempt to overturn that dismissal on appeal. Given
the number of intercircuit and intracircuit splits on fundamental aspects of the doctrine, 32 a colorable basis for appeal will exist in nearly
every case dismissed for forum non conveniens. As a result, parties
will have every incentive to zealously pursue an appeal.
B.

Regulatory Inefficiency

In addition to the forum non conveniens doctrine's litigation inefficiency, which increases costs borne by parties and courts, the doctrine also suffers from a regulatory inefficiency that increases costs to
the economy more broadly. The balance between litigation and regulation is a delicate one, and raising the overall cost of litigation
through multiple forum non conveniens proceedings can have a corresponding effect on national and international regulatory policies. 33
The regulatory problem begins at the level of the individual actor.
The Supreme Court may be right to conclude that the doctrine as currently formulated cannot effectively guide secondary conduct in litiga30. See Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 513, 523 (2009).
31. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CoRNELL L.
REv. 481, 522 (2011); see also Heiser, supra note 29, at 609 (noting that courts will grant such a
motion in "nearly every case") but compare In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d
1125, 1156 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (retaining jurisdiction over tire-defect rollover cases brought by
Venezulan plaintiffs). Other rollover cases-even some involving the same defendants-were
dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See, e.g., Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313
F. Supp. 2d 672, 682-83 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665,
672 (5th Cir. 2003).
32. See supra notes 19-28.
33. See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on
Transnational Litigation, 44 CAsE WEs. REs. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012) available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966202.
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tion, 34 but the doctrine may nevertheless guide primary conduct in the
marketplace, albeit inefficiently and ineffectively. 35 One scholar has
pointed out that the doctrine's uncertainty makes it more likely that
"an outlying jurisdiction's policies [might] drive the conduct of a party
that operates throughout the country, if not the world." 36 When multinational companies estimate litigation costs, they must prepare for a
worst-case scenario-what is the most expensive, least convenient forum in which they may be called to defend? 37 Even if only some
courts within a particular forum will accept the case while most would
dismiss it, companies may well structure their conduct to avoid even
the possibility of being subject to suit in an undesired forum? 8
If parties could make a more accurate prediction regarding the
likelihood of standing trial in the United States, they could structure
their conduct more efficiently. If they were able to do so, the efficiency of national regulatory efforts would similarly improve. Right
now, judicially developed court-access standards do not align with
Congress's regulatory priorities. 39
Before court-access standards can be aligned with legislative priorities, however, those standards must be articulated and must be con34. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller. 510 U.S. 443, 455, 114 S. Ct. 981, 989, 127 L. Ed. 2d 285
(1994) ("But to tell the truth. forum non conveniens cannot really be relied upon in making
decisions about secondary conduct-in deciding, for example, where to sue or where one is
subject to being sued."). In contrast. the personal jurisdiction doctrine is intended to allow parties to structure their activities as part of the larger due process protection. See, e.g .. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause ... allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.'').
35. See, e.g., Allin C. Seward III, After Bhopal: Implications for Parent Company Liability,
21 INT'L LAW. 695, 706 (1987) (noting that, for example, the doctrine may cause U.S. corporations to invest outside the United States, as "[t]he greater the degree of commitment and the
greater the concentration of resources abroad, the greater the difficulty a U.S. court will have in
justifying a retention of jurisdiction"); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine
In Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1259, 1263 ("[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens has
outlived its usefulness.").
36. Andrew R. Klein. Foreign Plaimitfs, Forum non Conveniens, and Consistency. in SELECTED EssAYS oN CuRRENT LEGAL IssuEs 193 (David Frenkel & Carsten Gerner-Beuerle
eds., 2008).
37. See Seward, supra note 35, at 706 (making recommendations for avoiding a U.S. forum).
38. In fact, an in-house attorney for Upjohn wrote an article recommending various business measures that U.S. multinationals might take to minimize the risk of being called to defend
transnational actions in U.S. courts. Id.
39. See Elizabeth T. Lear. Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friclion on lhe Frontier of the Inherem Power. 91 IowA L. REv. 1147, 1166 (2006) ("The current
federal forum non conveniens regime is flatly out of step with a number of congressional regulatory decisions .... untold legislative enactments now seek explicitly to regulate extraterritorial
events.").
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sistently applied. 40 At this time, they are not: while occasionally courts
and commentators will opine on the relationship between national
regulatory interests and court access standards, their opinions often
conflict. As a result, there is widespread confusion about how regulatory interests should be aligned with court access, and there is disagreement about which nation's regulatory interests should be given
greater weight, in the forum non conveniens analysis, for resolving
foreign plaintiffs' product-liability claims involving U.S. products. 41

C.

The Perception-and Reality-of Injustice

The unpredictability of the forum non conveniens doctrine also
leads to the perception of injustice. On the international level, this
perception can cause foreign-relations headaches and retaliation. 42
Because the United States has not set a clear court-access policy for
foreign plaintiffs, and because many civil law nations expect jurisdiction to be proper in the defendants' home forum, the discretionary
dismissal of foreign plaintiffs' claims may be seen by other nations as
discriminatory and unjust. 43 Some nations have lodged diplomatic
protests or have passed retaliatory legislation. 44 The large civil judg40. See infra Part IV.
41. Compare In re Fosamax Products Liab, Litig., No. 1:06-cv-5087 (JFK). 2009 WL
3398930, *4 (S.D.N. Y. 2009) ("Pharmaceutical products liability cases involving an allegedly
unsafe drug that was sold in a foreign country subject to its regulatory scheme, and then later
ingested by plaintiff in that foreign country, are especially susceptible to forum non conveniens
dismissal clue to the foreign country's strong interest in the matter. In these cases, the foreign
nation has an interest in protecting its citizens from alleged injuries caused by events occurring
within its borders.") (citation omitted) with Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Forum Non Conveniens. 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 559, 562 (2007) ("In the majority of
international torts claims, forum non conveniens dismissals subvert essential American interests .... [E]ven in cases brought by foreign plaintiffs injured in foreign countries by globally
marketed goods, forum non conveniens dismissals undermine critical American interests in
deterrence.").
42. See Whytock & Robertson. supra note 18. at 1491-92.
43. !d.; see also Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, supra note 6,
at 1083 ("Allowing U.S. judges to cliscretionarily dismiss cases against U.S. corporations contravenes this strong sociolegal tradition and gives rise to the criticism that the forum non conveniens doctrine operates as a 'tool to escape liability,' denying foreign plaintiffs the advantages
of the U.S. federal court system.") (quoting RoNALD A. BRAND & Scorr R. JABLONSKI. FoRUM
NoN CoNVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FuTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CoNVENTION ON CHOICE OF CouRT AGREEMENTS 128, 129 (2007); Louise Weinberg, Insights and lronies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 307, 312 (1985) ("Maintaining the Bhopal
cases in [U.S.] courts would not violate principles of international comity ... [but in fact] granting access would be an exercise in comity.").
44. Letter from Leonidas Plaza Vercluga, Attorney Gen. of Ecuador, to U.S. Attorney Gen.
Janet Reno (Jan. 15, 1997). available at http:l/www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum_non_Ecuador.htm
(lodging official complaint that courts have used forum non conveniens doctrine to "close the
doors of American courts to citizens of my country").
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ment Chevron currently faces in Ecuador may be a direct result of
displeasure with the case's earlier dismissal by a U.S. court. 45
The perception of injustice also matters at the individual level. 46
Foreign plaintiffs may lack a remedy altogether if they cannot pursue
the case in a U.S. court. 47 The perception of injustice may be especially strong if the plaintiffs manage to win a lawsuit in their home
country after dismissal from the United States, but are then unable to
enforce the judgment in the defendant's home country. 48 Even when
the inconsistency is limited to court access in the first instance, inconsistent rulings will give rise to a perception of injustice. 49 When plaintiffs' access to an effective remedy is inconsistent, unpredictable, and
varies according to seemingly random geographic districts, parties will
lose trust in the system and in the rule of law more broadly. 50

III.

CoNSTRAINING DISCRETION ON APPEAL

The classic remedy for inconsistent application of the law is appellate review. Appellate courts-especially the Supreme Court"announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules of decisions employed by
the legal system in which they serve. " 51 Appellate review of district
court decisionmaking fulfills three basic roles in the judicial process:
45. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 18, at 1447-48.
46. See Fromherz, supra note 7 ("It is a basic tenet of judicial fairness that similar cases
ought to receive similar treatment.").
47. Robertson, supra note 17, at 418-20; Jeff Todd, Phamom Torts and Forum Non Conveniens Blocking Sratll/es: Irony and Metonymy in Nicaraguan Special Law 364, 43 U. MIAMI
lNTER-Alvl L. REv. (forthcoming) (noting that "calls for justice" in transnational cases are often
"reduced to a mandate for U.S. court trials," as plaintiffs and commentators overlook other
mechanisms, including settlement programs. that could also offer corrective justice).
48. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 18, at 1482-83.
49. While it is true that not all inconsistency arises from unpredictability. even predictable
inconsistency will give rise to a sense of capricious injustice. Thus, for example. the political
party of the federal judge's appointing President may help model the likelihood of forum non
conveniens dismissal. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Fomm Shopping System, 96
CoRNELL L. REv. 481, 526 (2011) ("Judges nominated by Republicans appear more concerned
with keeping foreign plaintiffs from forum shopping into the U.S. federal courts than those nominated by Democrats; and, in terms of territorial factors, Republican nominees appear more
concerned with the place of conduct, and Democratic nominees appear more concerned with the
place of injury."). But that predictability does nothing to encourage respect for the rule of law.
50. See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation
111ith aSpotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable
Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, "Mend the Hold," "Fraud on the Court" and Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CoNN. Ins. L.J. 589, 733 (1998) ("The doctrines that prevent
litigants from assuming inconsistent positions protect judicial integrity and ultimately. the public's trust in the rule of law.").
51. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR, AND MAURICE ROSENBERG. JUSTICE ON
APPEAL 5 (1976).
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(1) it increases the probability of a correct judgment; (2) it provides
greater uniformity of result; and (3) it increases litigants' sense that
their dispute has been fully and fairly heard and thereby increases respect for the rule of law. 52
At least in the area of forum non conveniens, however, these benefits remain elusive. Part of the problem, as other scholars have suggested, is a lack of clarity about the fundamental role of forum non
conveniens and the interests it protects. A confounding factor, however, is the lack of effective appellate review, and, in particular, the
lack of interlocutory appellate review of decisions denying a forum
non conveniens motion and retaining jurisdiction. These two factors
work in tandem. Without greater appellate review-and specifically,
without interlocutory review of decisions retaining jurisdiction-the
substantive law of forum access will never be consistent or coherent. 5 3
And without greater attention to the substantive law of forum non
conveniens, appellate courts will continue to offer unhelpful guidance
in this area in those instances in which a party appeals from a forum
non conveniens dismissal. 54
A.

Lack of Clarity Regarding the District Court's Procedural
Discretion

Interlocutory appellate review is necessary to delimit the scope of
the district court's discretion, particularly its discretion to retain cases.
Although forum non conveniens motions are common in transnational litigation, and although nearly half of such motions are denied,
appellate courts almost never review a district court's decision to retain jurisdiction. While a decision to dismiss is a final judgment that

52. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L REv. 733, 771 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REv. 527, 530-31 (2002) (describing a
"procedural uncoupling" in which ''appellate courts never effectively review many of the most
controversial rulings and innovations" of trial judges).
54. See Thomas 0. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L.
REv. 801, 802 (2010) ("[T]he construction of substantive law necessarily entails making assumptions about how that law ultimately will be enforced. Many of those assumptions are rooted in
the procedures pursuant to which a claim to vindicate that law would be litigated. . .. This
contextualization of substantive law within a procedural framework will be subconscious when
not deliberate.").
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can be reversed for abuse of discretion, 55 a decision refusing to dismiss
is not a final order and is not immediately appealable as of right. 56
Theoretically, the issue may still be decided after a trial on the
merits, but it rarely is. 5 7 By that time, many of the factors in the forum
non conveniens analysis will have become moot: whatever the balance
of conveniences was before trial, it is no longer the same once a trial
has been held. Retrying the case is itself highly inconvenient. 58 Consequently, remanding the case for retrial in a more convenient forum
would only add to the overall expense and delay of the case. 59
As a result, a district judge's decision to retain a case is almost
never overruled, even when that decision is inconsistent with other
courts' rulings. This unconstrained discretion explains a great deal of
the doctrine's lack of predictability, as it allows the creation of unresolvable intercircuit and intracircuit conflicts in the application of
forum non conveniens law. 60 In this sense, the district court's discretion can be described as "review-limiting" discretion to retain casesthat is, "there may be law constraining the trial court's decision, but
there will be [almost] no appellate review of that decision. " 61 Such
discretion 'gives the tlial judge a right to be wrong without incurling
reversal.' " 62
It is less clear, however, whether the district court judge would be
acting within permissible discretion to retain a case under these circumstances.Can the judge be said to err if he or she chooses to keep a
55. See, e.g., Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007) (reviewing a forum non conveniens dismissal).
56. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988). Interlocutory review may be
available by mandamus in exceptional cases or through 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) if both the district
court and the court of appeals agree to such review.
57. Christina Melady Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and
Venue Transfer Orders, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 715, 728-29 (1991) ("[C]ourts are unwilling to
review meaningfully forum convenience orders after final judgment.").
58. Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, supra note 6, at 1097-99;
see Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The fact that the district
court tried this case to a conclusion indicates that Zelinski's forum of choice was, if not convenient for Columbia, at least workable. Furthermore, at this point the public interest certainly
would not be well-served by deciding to jettison the untold hours of work put into this case
... .");see also Demenus v. Tinton 35, Inc., 873 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that a forum
non conveniens motion 'fails to survive the mooting effect of the actual litigation of the suit in
the putative inconvenient forum'); but see Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881
(5th Cir. 1987) (reversing even after trial on the merits).
59. Zelinski, 335 F.3d at 643.
60. See supra Part III.
61. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TuL. L. REv. 157, 202 (2008)
(quoting Maurice Rosenberg. Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 638 (1971)).
62. Jd.

458

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18

case wben the public and private interest factors might actually support dismissal? This type of discretion is called "decision-liberating"
discretion, because the judge possesses the freedom to retain a case
even when the factors would easily permit dismissal, and is "free to
render the decision it chooses. " 63
Historically, the forum non conveniens doctrine was likely viewed
as "decision liberating." If the factors were met, the court could
choose either to dismiss or retain the case. Such decision-liberating
discretion is consistent with the traditional view of the doctrine as a
matter of convenience and docket protection, because the district
court judge is in the best position to consider the administrative impact of retaining the case. In addition, the Supreme Court's typical
phrasing of the forum non conveniens doctrine sounds permissive,
rather than mandatory: it states that "a federal court has discretion to
dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens 'when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [the] case, and ... trial in the
chosen forum would establish ... oppressiveness and vexation to a
defendant ... out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience, or ...
the chosen forum [is) inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems."' 64
The view that judges should have full discretion to retain a case
may be changing over time, however. Federal courts have been willing, on occasion, to review interlocutory orders retaining jurisdiction.
In at least one recent case, the appellate court ordered the district
court to dismiss based on the weight of the factors pointing toward
dismissal. 65 And while Congress has not yet clarified the federal doctrine, at least one state has amended its forum non conveniens statute
to move from a permissive statute to one that mandates dismissal
when the factors are satisfied. 66
Courts also seem to be attaching more precedential weight to earlier forum non conveniens decisions, a practice which also suggests
that the forum non conveniens decision is not entirely a matter of
case-by-case discretion. The traditional view of forum non conveniens
63. !d. (quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above. 22 SYRACUSE L REv. 635, 638 (1971)).
64. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007).
65. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 392
n.10 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno 'A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881 (5th Cir.
1987).
66. See In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d 681, 685-87 (Tex. 2008) (noting that the Texas
legislature had amended the forum non conveniens statute to provide that the district judge
"'shall" dismiss when the factors are met, whereas the prior statute had provided that the judge
"may" dismiss).
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left no room for preclusion; each case possessed a unique mix of the
public and private interest factors, and therefore each case would require a fresh analysis. 67 More recently, however, some appellate
courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have been willing to assume that
broad factors can limit the need to undertake such discretionary analysis.68 If for example, one tire rollover case may be appropriately tried
in Latin America, then other cases will be bound by that decision even
if they involve different claims and potentially different forum countries.69 If such decisions are indeed binding in subsequent cases, then
the district judge cannot possess full discretion to retain a case when
the interest factors would otherwise weigh in favor of dismissal.
These questions are unsettled because the scope of the district
court's authority to retain a case cannot be determined without effective interlocutory review. 70 When the decision to retain a case is almost impervious to the appellate process, then it is impossible to
determine whether that authority exists. Because the district judge's
decision is protected by review-limiting discretion, it is impossible to
know whether the judge also possesses decision-liberating discretion.
B.

Lack of Clarity Regarding the Substantive Interests Protected

Intertwined with the problem of limited appellate review is the
need to identify what substantive interests the forum non conveniens
doctrine should protect. Because the protected interests are not
clearly identified, courts do not know what standards to apply on appeal. At the same time, however, because decisions to retain jurisdiction cannot be effectively reviewed at this time, appellate courts
cannot effectively "announce, clarify, and harmonize" the interests
protected by the doctrine. 71
67. Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672,682-83 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (noting that the
different location of tire manufacturer and the fact that "the suit involved traffic accidents in
Colombia, not Mexico" made plaintiffs' reliance on the earlier case "problematic").
68. See See Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co. 662 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2011), in which
the court criticized one of the attorneys for failing to disclose "apparently dispositive precedent".
However, the "dispositive precedent" involved a different forum country, Argentina, rather than
Mexico. Additionally, Mexican courts, unlike their Argentinian counterparts, had ruled that
Mexico lacked jurisdiction over the defendants. See Joe Palazzolo. Who's the Ostrich?, WALL ST.
J. LAw BLoG, Nov. 28, 2011 at http:/lblogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/28/whos-the-ostrich/ ("Not only
is it on a different continent, the record we presented had no fewer than ten cases dismissed by
Mexican courts proving that Mexico does not have any jurisdiction over foreign defendants.").
69. See Gonzalez-Servin. 662 F.3d at 934.
70. See supra notes 55 - 62.
71. See supra note 51.
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One of the first issues to be decided is whether the doctrine is
intended only to avoid trial in a highly inconvenient forum (the "oppressive and vexatious" 72 view), or whether it is also intended to direct cases into the most convenient forum (the "most suitable
forum" 73 view). There is support for both points of view in current
U.S. caselaw/4 and there is also support for both points of view in the
practice of other countries. 75 If the goal is only to avoid an oppressively inconvenient forum, then appellate review of decisions to retain
jurisdiction will rarely be necessary; the district court knows its docket
and can predict how difficult it will be to try the case. No other court
is in a better position to determine whether the case is vexatious, and
no court has more of an incentive to quickly dispose of truly vexatious
cases. 76
On the other hand, however, if the United States has in fact
moved closer to the "most suitable forum" test, then there is a need
for appellate review of decisions denying forum non conveniens decisions. When the question becomes a comparative one-which forum
is better suited to hear the case, which forum has a greater interest in
the case, which forum could resolve the case most efficiently-then
additional review is warranted. At that point, the question is not just
discretion. It is, instead, a question of discretion bounded by questions
of law, bounded by the interpretation of each of the public and private
interest factors and constrained by the weight given to each of them in
a particular context. While there would still be room for the district

72. See BRAND & JABLONSKr, supra note 43, at 11.
73. !d. at 14.
74. Compare Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
test is "whether defendants have made a clear showing of facts which establish such oppression
and vexation of a defendant as to be out of proportion to plaintiff's convenience, which may be
shown to be slight or nonexistent" and providing that "(f]orum non conveniens is an exceptional
tool to be employed sparingly, not a doctrine that compels plaintiffs to choose the optimal forum
for their claim") with Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The 'ultimate
inquiry' in a forum non conveniens analysis is where the place of trial will 'best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.'") (citing Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330
u.s. 518, 527 (1947)).
75. BRAND & JABLONSKr, supra note 43, at 87 (noting that Australia has maintained the
"vexation and oppression" test, while Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom have
generally moved closer to a "most appropriate forum" standard).
76. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Etv!ORY L.J. 747, 754 (1982)
("(I]n these days of crowded dockets there is an inevitable risk of some degree of subconscious
bias when the decision whether to dismiss a case because of forum non conveniens is made by
the judge who will have to try it if the motion is denied.").
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court to exercise discretion, that discretion would be substantially
more constrained. 77
Finally, there is also the question of what interests, in addition to
litigation convenience, are protected by the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Although the doctrine was founded on the idea of convenience, most commentators agree that the doctrine has expanded significantly from that original purpose. For one thing, the number of
forum non conveniens dismissals has been growing78 just as modern
technology reduces the inconvenience of litigation in U.S. courts. 79 As
one recent judicial opinion stated, the doctrine is now assumed to protect an interest "considerably broader than the colloquial understanding of the word 'convenient,' which may be one reason why the phrase
forum non conveniens is best rendered in Latin. " 80 The scope of this
interest, however, "rests on unarticulated and unexamined substantive
assumptions. " 81
Because these assumptions are unstated and merely implicit, appellate courts struggle to articulate reasons to affirm or reverse district
court judgments dismissing cases for forum non conveniens. Some
cases explicitly take into account considerations not easily made part
of the public or private interest factors, such as a foreign sovereign's
interest in applying its own damage caps. 82 Other courts implicitly defer to U.S. economic interests by applying a stricter review of cases
brought by foreign plaintiffs against U.S. corporate defendants. 83
The difficulty in clarifying the protected interests is heightened by
the difference between the parties' objectives and the doctrine's stated
purpose. For the parties, what matters is the ultimate recovery: plain77. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of
Judgment. 64 U. MIAMI L. REv. 947, 952 (2010) (defining discretion as "authority to choose
within a range of possible legitimate outcomes." bounded by the "range of legitimate substantive
outcomes."). When the range of legitimate substantive outcomes is restricted by principles of
law, then discretion will necessarily be more limited.
78. See supra note 14.
79. See Martin Davies, The Impact of Digital Technology on Forwn Non Conveniens in
lmemational Litigation, TULANE LAw., Spring/Summer 2002 available at http://www.law.tulane.
edu/uploadedfiles/faculty/notebook_davies.pdf.
80. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 392
n.lO (2d Cir. 2011).
81. GARY B. BoRN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES CouRTS 369 (4th ed. 2007).
82. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 392
n.lO (2d Cir. 2011).
83. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CoRNELL L.
REv. 481. 526 (2011) (noting that some judges "appear more concerned with keeping foreign
plaintiffs from forum shopping into the U.S. federal courts"').
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tiffs want access to U.S. courts when they believe it will maximize
their chance of financial recovery, and defendants want dismissal from
the U.S. when they believe that recovery will be lessened-or nonexistent-elsewhere. Thus, what the parties are really litigating about is
different from what the doctrine ostensibly protects. 84
The tension between party goals and doctrinal purpose is further
exacerbated by a shift in the doctrine's application from domestic
cases to transnational ones. When the doctrine was first applied in
United States courts many decades ago as a way of identifying a convenient forum for domestic litigants, it really was about convenience,
both for the parties and for the courts. While there may have been
some difference in recovery based on state choice-of-law rules, these
state-by-state differences were much smaller than the transnational
differences that exist today. Because the doctrine was supplanted by a
statutory transfer of venue system for domestic litigation in federal
courts, however, it no longer applies in purely domestic litigation. 85 As
result, the doctrine is now applied almost exclusively in transnational
cases, but does not-at least not yet-account for the transnational
concerns of comity, foreign relations, or competing sovereign
interests. 86

C.

Varying Levels of Scrutiny

When forum non conveniens cases (typically dismissals, as noted
above 87 ) are reviewed on appeal, courts will apply varying levels of
scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held that appellate courts should review the district court's forum non conveniens decision for abuse of
84. See BoRN & RuTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 396 (comparing the motion to ·'teenagers on
their first date, conscientiously talking about everything except what is on their minds").
85. See Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp .. 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007)
("The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing application [in federal
courts] only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad, and perhaps in rare instances where
a state or territorial court serves litigational convenience best. For the federal court system,
Congress has codified the doctrine and has provided for transfer, rather than dismissal, when a
sister federal court is the more convenient place for trial of the action.'') (quoting American
Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994); other citations omitted).
86. This failure to account for international interests is representative of transnational litigation in United States courts more generally. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation
a Distinct Field? The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J
lNT'L L. 301, 305 (2008) ("When American courts are confronted with disputes with a transnational dimension, they reach for a familiar toolbox-one with tools for fixing domestic problems.
They extrapolate from their experience with familiar domestic litigation. especially interstate
litigation.").
87. See supra Part liLA.
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discretion, which is a highly deferential standard of review. 88 When
the district court "has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable" the
appellate court should give that decision "substantial deference." 89
Even here, however, there is room for disagreement and differing interpretations. Some appellate courts will conclude that the district
court abused its discretion in dismissing a case even when it considered each of the relevant factors, but simply gave a different weight to
the facts presented; for these courts, the fact that the appellate court
would give different weights to the factors in a particular case is
enough to find an abuse of discretion. 90 Other appellate courts will
reverse only if they conclude that the district court made an error of
law in applying the factors; these courts will remand for the district
court to re-weigh the public and private interest factors. 91
Finally, some courts may agree with the more deferential standard in theory but may apply a stricter level of review in practice. The
Third Circuit, for example, once remanded a case to allow the district
court to re-weigh the factors, but vacated the district court's order a
second time when it again concluded that the factors supported dismissal.92 In the appellate court's second opinion, its mandate specified
that the district court should not re-weigh the forum non conveniens
factors; instead, the appellate court was "remand[ing] so that discovery and trial can proceed." 93
88. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) ("The forum non conveniens
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion .... ").
89. !d.
90. See, e.g., Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1991) ("We conclude that
the district court erred in granting a dismissal based on forum non conveniens. Proper deference
to the plaintiff's forum choice, where the defendants reside, coupled with the proper weighing of
the Gilbert factors, requires reversal."); Boston Telecomm's Grp., Inc. v. Wood, 588 F.3d 1201.
1210 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Here, the district court abused its discretion in holding that this private
interest factor was neutral when Wood provided very little information that would have enabled
the district court to understand why various witnesses were material to his defense.").
91. See, e.g., Wilson v. Island Seas Inv's, Ltd., 590 F.3d 1264, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009) ("This is
not to say, of course, that the district court cannot again determine that the case should be tried
in the Bahamas after further development of the factual record and further consideration of the
private interests as directed by this opinion.).
92. Lony v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 935 F.2d 604, 615 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[W]e conclude once again that in light of the balance of private and public interest factors as we have
outlined above, in addition to the extent of merits proceedings already underway, the district
court abused its discretion in dismissing Lony's complaint on the grounds of forum non
conveniens'").
93. /d.
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Scholars have recommended trying to standardize the appellate
scrutiny given on appeal, recommending that scrutiny be raised either
to a "de novo" standard 94 or to an "abuse of discretion plus" standard.95 A more rigorous appellate analysis is certainly warranted, but
such a rigorous analysis would be almost impossible to implement
without also regularly permitting interlocutory review. Adopting a
more rigorous standard of review, but reviewing only the cases that
get dismissed, means reversing more decisions to dismiss without similarly scrutinizing decisions to retain jurisdiction. Such a lopsided appellate review would still leave significant issues unresolved, so that
questions like the scope of the district judge's discretion to retain
cases and the nature of the interests protected by forum non conveniens would continue to escape clarification. As a result, stricter
(but unbalanced) appellate review would have a perverse effect: it
would provide extra scrutiny of only one-half of the equation, and
would therefore offer a false sense of accuracy while doing nothing to
resolve the basic inconsistencies of the doctrine. Doctrinal clarity can
be achieved only by combining such added scrutiny with a robust interlocutory appeal process.
IV.

THE RoAD FoRWARD

The forum non conveniens doctrine is not the only doctrine to
suffer a mismatch between the procedures applied at the district court
level and the ability of appellate courts to scrutinize those procedures.
Scholars have referred to this phenomenon as "procedural uncoupling."96 Expanded interlocutory review is frequently recommended
as a solution to establish consistency and align policy choices with litigation realities. 97
94. See Klein, supra note 7; William L Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L.
REv. 1663, 1688 (1992) ("Because the forum non conveniens motion has such a significant impact on the litigation, the standard of review should be nondeferential. and expressly so, despite
the costs. The trial court's ruling below can easily be treated as it normally would be treated-as
a question of law subject to de novo review.").
95. From/zerz, supra note 7.
96. See Waters, supra note 53, at 530; Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences
of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wrs. L REv. 631, 640-41 (1994) ("Nineteenth-century civil procedure grew from a tight connection between trial and appellate court procedure. Both developed
in tandem. Trial courts began to regulate trials more elaborately, and appellate courts kept pace,
creating new procedures and scrutinizing trial courts' use of them. Today the two tiers have
become uncoupled. Trial courts work with ever-more-elaborate procedural tools, but appellate
courts have not correspondingly increased their supervisory powers.").
97. See Waters, supra note 53, at 585-86 ("To address adequately the problem of procedural
uncoupling, an interlocutory review device must enable appellate courts to intervene in any of
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It was just this disconnect that led to the adoption of an expanded
interlocutory review rule for decisions granting or denying class certification.98 And class certification is a good analogue to the forum non
conveniens dilemma: as other scholars have noted, both types of decisions, though nominatively procedural, may be effectively dispositive
for the parties who therefore battle fervently over the issue. 99 Appellate courts have in fact taken advantage of their expanded power of
interlocutory review, and have significantly increased the reversal rate
of class-certification decisions. 100

A.

Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Appellate Review

Of course, there are counterarguments to expanding appellate review. First, the expansion of appellate review increases the costs of
litigation. Specifically, allowing defendants to appeal the district
court's decision to retain a case causes delays for the plaintiffs, who
must wait longer to get to trial. If the plaintiffs lack litigation resources, this delay can present a significant hardship and can reduce
the settlement value even of a meritorious claim. 101 Second, it is reasonable to question whether these higher costs are worth incurring
when there is already some appellate review of forum non conveniens
decisions-specifically, review of those cases dismissed at the district
court leveJ.l 02 Unlike class-certification decisions, where neither the
decision to grant nor the decision to deny was previously appealable,
approximately half of all forum non conveniens decisions are dismissals and therefore qualify as appealable final judgments. 103
While these costs are not insignificant, I argue that appellate review is nevertheless warranted. First, the uncertainty over forum
these areas in order to provide guidance to trial courts and to participate in the development of
new substantive or procedural law."').
98. ld. at 586.
99. Fromherz. supra note 7, at 17-20.
100. !d. at 24-25.
101. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRAcusE L. REv. 635, 662 (1971) (noting that delay for interlocutory appeal allows "the party
with the deeper pocket" to wear down the opposing party "by challenging every uncongenial
ruling. whether made in the pleading, discovery, trial or post-trial phases of the litigation"); see
also Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation. 44 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966202 ("Plaintiffs without available cash on hand cannot always afford
to file suits even when the expected payment would make such a suit economically worthwhile; if
they do not have cash on hand to pay litigation costs, they cannot file suit even when the expected recovery significantly outweighs litigation costs.").
102. See supra Part III.
103. See supra note 30.
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choice may well create higher litigation costs than would an increase
in interlocutory appeals. Because litigants cannot reliably predict
whether the district court will retain the case, they must litigate questions of forum choice in nearly every transnational case, and they
must reargue those questions on appeal if the case is dismissed. 104 Expanding the use of interlocutory appeals would increase litigation
costs in the short term, but would likely minimize the total amount of
litigation over forum choice in the long term, as the circuit courts offer
more guidelines for the district courts to follow and thereby reduce
the need to argue these questions in future cases.
Second, while it is true that there is currently review of forum non
conveniens dismissals, this limited review may create more problems
than it solves. Because only dismissals are now reviewed, the cases
that reach the circuit courts are a biased sample. Appellate courts cannot reach the essential questions regarding the scope of the district
judge's discretion because the courts cannot' reliably review cases in
which the district court exercised that discretion to retain a case. Instead, they can review only cases where the judge exercised discretion
to dismiss it. 105 As a result, the appellate courts cannot apply a co herent theory of forum non conveniens that encompasses the full range of
the trial judge's discretion. 106 Without such a coherent theory to sustain the forum non conveniens review, even review of dismissals will
necessarily be haphazard and unpredictable. 107
Finally, even if expanding appellate rights did increase litigation
costs overall, the higher cost may still be justified by increasing trust in
the justice system and respect for the rule of law. As others have
noted, plaintiffs who are able to "secure a dramatically different outcome simply by choosing a certain court," make the legal system appear to be "arbitrary and unconcerned with administering
fundamental justice. " 108 Over the long term, these apparently arbitrary decisions can erode respect for the legal system and diminish
public confidence in the judiciary. 109
The costs of uncertainty, the problems with one-sided review, and
the arbitrary appearance of current decisions therefore support
104. See supra Part II.A.
105. See supra Part III.A.
106. See supra Part III.B.
107. ld.
108. Daniel J. Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection of
Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L.141, 152
(1998).
109. ld.
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greater interlocutory review of forum non conveniens decisions. The
costs of expanded appeal remain relevant, however, and should be
taken into account in developing procedures for review. The next
subsection addresses potential ways to expand appellate review while
still minimizing cost and inconvenience.

B.

Options for Expanding Appellate Review

The available framework for expanding interlocutory review consists of a complex web of appellate remedies.U 0 There are three potential ways to increase the availability of interlocutory appeals: (1)
Congress could adopt a forum non conveniens statute that includes
appellate remedies;m (2) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could
be amended to allow for interlocutory review; 112 or (3) courts could
certify more cases for interlocutory review on a piecemeal basis, with
mandamus remedies available in extreme cases. 113 These options are
presented in order of their desirability, but in reverse order of their
ease of adoption. Any of these options, however, would represent progress in aligning the doctrinal goals and litigation practices of courtaccess decisions.
1.

Creating a Statutory Framework

Because the unpredictability of the forum non conveniens doctrine is composed of intertwined procedural and substantive ques110. See Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdicfion. 48 B.C. L. REv. 1237, 1227
(2007) ("Appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory trial court rulings is among the most troublesome issues in civil procedure."); Robertson, Appellme Review of Disco\'e'J' Orders, supra note
62, at 786 (noting that "[t]he current approaches to interlocutory review" are ... " haphazard");
see also Rory Ryan, Luke Meier, & Jeremy Counseller.InterloClttol:v Review of Orders Denying
Remand Motions, 63 BAYLOR L. REv. 734, 737-59 (2011) (articulating the complex relationship
of interlocutory review and mandamus).
111. See AndrewS. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1643, 1655 (2011) (noting that Congress has not
used this power in the last few decades, but has instead "play[ed] hot potato over the issue" by
vesting power in the Supreme Court to enact such exceptions in its rulemaking process).
112. 28 U.S.C. §1292(e) (2006) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b). (c), or (d).").
113. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (2006) ("When a district judge, ... shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals
which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon. in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order .... "). Review under the Cohen collateral order
doctrine is unavailable to review a decision not to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens
grounds. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517. 529 (1988).
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tions, Congress is best positioned to resolve the current
inconsistencies. By implementing a new statutory framework that sets
out both the substantive choices shaping court-access policy and the
procedural mechanisms needed to protect those policy choices, Congress could better account for the relevant policy interests affected by
court-access doctrine. Specifically, it could weigh comparative sovereign interests, foreign relations, and economic realities. 114 Legislation
by Congress would uniquely be able to combine these substantive policies with procedural requirements, ensuring that the forum non conveniens determination aligned with economic and political realities.
Of course, it is difficult to predict just how Congress would balance
competing policy choices; nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere,
the stability gained from enacting such a statute is likely to be beneficial regardless of whether the statute narrows or expands court access
in transnational cases.U 5
However, while such a statute would be beneficial, it is unlikely
to be available in the near term. As Professor James Pfander has
noted, "[a ]part from imperfect foresight, Congress suffers from another shortcoming as a jurisdiction-managing institution-lack of interest."116 Creating a set of coherent rules for forum non conveniens
motions is simply not likely to be a high priority for the average
legislator. 117
2.

Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

If Congress is unlikely to adopt a full forum non conveniens statute, action by judicial rulemakers offers a close second-best option.
Authority already exists for this action: Congress has statutorily delegated rulemaking power over the expansion of interlocutory re114. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity As Conflict: Resituating International Comity As
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAvrs L. REv. 11, 78 (2010) ("Until such a time that Congress provides direction for comity cases, courts should resist the call to create judicial doctrines of abstention that tramp on sovereign interests. especially when such invocations of the doctrine do
not explicitly take account of the direct sovereign interests a court's decision implicates."); Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, supra note 6, at 1120-21.
115. See Robertson, supra note 6.
116. James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supen,isory
Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. P A. L. REv. 493, 534 (2011).
117. !d. ("Interest groups may press for public expenditures, such as the repair of roads and
bridges, but they are unlikely to press for jurisdictional repairs. The combined absence of interest group support and, dare I say it, intrinsic interest, can sometimes consign jurisdictional reform to legislative limbo.").
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view. 118 It is true that this process lacks the ability to make the kind of
substantive policy choices that Congress could create in a comprehensive statute. Nonetheless, there are two important advantages to
rulemaking process: expertise and interest. 119 While questions of litigation procedure and jurisdiction may not be high priorities for Congress members, they are paramount for the litigators, judges, and law
professors who would likely be heavily involved in the drafting
process. 120
If the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to allow
interlocutory review, the rule drafters would have to decide whether
that review would be mandatory or discretionary-would the defendant be able to appeal the denial of a forum non conveniens motion as
of right, or would the appellate court be able to decline the appeal? 121
Mandatory jurisdiction would create greater consistency. 122 On the
other hand, however, mandatory review creates significant costs that
may not be necessary: even discretionary review is likely to increase
review and therefore improve the consistency of forum non conveniens determinations. For example, when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were amended to allow interlocutory review of class-certification decisions, appellate review increased substantially. 123 In addition, discretion can allow courts to consider "case-specific
information," such as how the additional delay would affect the individual equities in a particular case. 124
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance
with section 2072 of this title. to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts
of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).").
119. See Pfander, supra note 116, at 537; see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S.
Ct. 599, 609, 175 L. Ed. 2d 458 (2009) ("[T]he rulemaking process has important virtues. It draws
on the collective experience of bench and bar. see 28 U.S.C. § 2073, and it facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions.").
120. I d. ("As for expertise, committees of the Judicial Conference draw their members from
the ranks of the state and federal judiciaries, as well as from the practicing bar. When the judges
feel that they lack the expertise to construct an effective set of rules, they have turned to law
professor consultants to assist with the work at hand.").
121. See Pollis. supra note 111 at 1659 ("We want courts to accept appeals from interlocutory
orders that raise a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence," but we do not want to burden
them by requiring them to hear appeals from orders that do not.").
122. Id. at 1662 ("A discretionary system is too vulnerable to the whims and prejudices of
individual judges who deny discretionary appeals in cases they wish to avoid and have no obligation to justify or explain why they do so.").
123. Id. at 1657-58 ("While class-certification orders were sometimes reviewed under an appellate court's mandamus power or under§ 1292(b), the promulgation of Rule 23(f) reflected
the prevailing view that these avenues were often inadequate."): Fromherz. supra note 7, at 1720.
124. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CoRNELL L. REv. 203, 249 (2011) ("Delay might be espe-

...
l
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Thus, it may make sense to increase review on a piecemeal basis
by starting with a rule allowing discretionary review of orders denying
forum non conveniens dismissal. Such discretionary review may be
sufficient to allow appellate courts to "identify the kinds of errors at
the district court level that require appellate correction" 125 and
thereby increase consistency and predictability. If a discretionary rule
proves inadequate and appellate courts fail to exercise their discretionary review power, the rule could later be amended to allow an
appeal as of right.
3.

Ad Hoc Discretionary Review

Even without amending current rules or statutes, the appellate
courts could elect to increase interlocutory review of forum non conveniens decisions on an ad hoc basis. There are two vehicles by which
the courts can do so: certifying an interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) or granting a petition for writ of mandamus. 126 While
both vehicles are currently available-and are occasionally used toreview the denial of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens 127 they are unlikely to provide a sufficient vehicle to secure predictability
in transnational litigation unless courts substantially increase their use.
At this time, both remedies are only rarely applied in forum non
conveniens cases. First, certification requires that the district court
find that there is a "controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion." This can be a difficult
requirement to meet: in forum non conveniens cases the dispositive
question likely involves how much weight to give to particular factors-in other words, the dispute is more likely to involve the application of law to particular facts, rather than a pure question of law. 128
cially problematic in ligl1t of the equities of a given case . . . . We want courts to have some
discretion because we want to harness this sort of case-specific information.").
125. Pfander. supra note 116, at 541 (discussing discretionary review in the context of remand orders).
126. See Pollis, supra note 111, at 1657 (explaining both mechanisms).
127. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, No. 09-3925-CV
L, 2011 WL 6188497 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2011) (applying§ 1292(b)); In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d
406, 415 (5th Cir. 2009) (providing mandamus relief).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 19-28; bill see Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as
First Responders: The Constitutionality and Propriety of Appellate Courts' Resolving Issues in the
First Instance, 87 NoTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1911455 ("One might ask whether the line between questions of law on the one hand,
and questions of fact and 'mixed questions' of law and fact, on the other, is a tenable one. The
slipperiness of the slope between questions of law and mixed questions of law is notorious
.... "). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that 1292(b) remains available to address
discovery orders on an interlocutory basis, and discovery orders similarly involve applications of
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Second, even if the dispute is interpreted to be a question of law, the
district judge must find that "an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 129 Due
to the inherent delay caused by interlocutory appeals, district court
judges may reasonably conclude that such delay would not speed resolution of the case. After all, the problems caused by the lack of interlocutory review are not necessarily problematic in any particular case.
Rather, the lack of review causes systemic problems when similar
cases reach conflicting outcomes and thereby create a chaotic system
overall. 130 Such systemic conflict is possible even if each case's resolution, considered individually, is not unreasonable. Finally, even if the
district court agrees to certify the case, the circuit court must agree to
hear it; the appellate court is not required to accept the appeal. 131
Mandamus review is also quite limited. 132 Appellate courts generally have the power to review district court orders through the exercise of the writ of mandamus, which "compel[s] a lower court ... to
perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly. " 133 The
power to issue a writ of mandamus comes from the All Writs Act,
which provides that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 134 As a result, mandamus can function "as akin to an
interlocutory appeal, a means to procure interlocutory review of a district court order. " 135 However, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that mandamus review is available only as a last resort in exceptional
cases; it is not a substitute for traditional appellate remedies. 136 As a
the law to particular facts. See Mohawk Indus .. Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607 (2009)
("The preconditions for§ 1292(b) review-"a controlling question of law," the prompt resolution of which "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation"-are most
likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves a new legal question or is of special consequence, and district courts should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal in such cases.").
129. 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b) (2006).
130. See supra Part II.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) ("The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an
appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order.").
132. See Robertson. supra note 62, at 750.
133. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th ed. 1999).
134. 28 u.s.c. § 1651 (2006).
135. Leah Epstein, Comment, A Balanced Approach to Mandamus Review of Allomey Disqualification Orders, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 667, 678 (2005).
136. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367.380 (2004) (quoting Will v. United States.
389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) and Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland. 346 U.S. 379. 383 (1953)) (providing that mandamus is an "extraordinary remedy," to be used in "only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power,' or a 'clear abuse of discretion.'").
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result, courts have been reluctant to grant mandamus relief in forum
.
non convemens
cases. 137
Given the limitations of certification and mandamus review, this
type of ad hoc appellate review is unlikely to solve the predictability
problems in forum non conveniens review. A statutory fix or rule
change would be vastly preferable. Nevertheless, the ad hoc tools do
have one advantage: they are at least potentially available to courts
now, even though they are underutilized. These mechanisms may
prove to be more useful if parties are able to persuade individual
courts that the systemic unpredictability problems in forum non conveniens cases warrant an increased reliance on appellate review mechanisms. If courts are willing to accept the inefficiencies of
interlocutory review in enough individual cases, they may be able to
reduce the overall systemic inefficiency in forum non conveniens
cases. In order to do so, however, courts must be willing to look beyond the short-term costs in favor of long-term benefit.
V.

CoNCLUSION

Court-access doctrine in transnational litigation is plagued by uncertainty. Judges possess largely unreviewable discretion in ruling on
forum non conveniens motions, and courts often come to inconsistent
decisions on very similar facts. As a result, the law underlying the forum non conveniens doctrine remains unsettled, increasing systemic
inefficiency both in litigation procedure and in regulatory policy.
Expanded interlocutory review would help increase consistency
and align policy choices with litigation realities. Ideally, Congress
should adopt a comprehensive forum non conveniens statute that
weighs the competing policy goals such as comparative sovereign interests, foreign relations, and economic realities, and creates a courtaccess procedure that accounts for these interests. Political realities
may make such legislation unlikely, however. A close second-best option is to proceed through the rulemaking process: an amendment to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that authorizes discretionary appeal of the denial of forum non conveniens motions could still go a
long way toward minimizing the costs of systemic uncertainty. Finally,
137. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., BridgestonefFirestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 344 F.3d 648,
651 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A writ of mandamus may issue only if the challenged order is effectively
unreviewable at the end of the case, it inflicts irreparable harm, and it 'so far exceed(sJ the
proper bounds of judicial discretion as to be legitimately considered usurpative in character, or
in violation of a clear and indisputable legal right, or, at the very least, patently erroneous.' By
their nature, forum non conveniens decisions are ill-suited to this remedy.") (quoting In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 FJd 1293, 1295 (7th Cir.l995)).
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until such a statutory or rule change takes effect, parties should urge
courts to apply current ad hoc discretionary review procedures
broadly. Although these procedures may increase cost and delay in
individual cases, they are likely to increase systemic efficiency over
the long run.

